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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that tax inequities are produced when property assessments
fail to account for the effects of creative financing .

Changes in equity

resulting from the capitalization of creative financing in housing prices
are estimated from a sample of properties in Portland, Oregon using the
Paglin-Fogarty model.

The principal findings of the analysis indicate that :

1) on average, creatively financed houses have a higher mean assessment ratio
than conventionally financed houses; 2) the assessment penalty for creative
financing is systematically related to the market value of houses, and is
both absolutel y and relatively larger for houses with lower market values;
3) while the assessment policy in effect during the study period dictated
that no adjustments should be made for creative financing, evidence of
negative capitalization of financing in assessments was found .

This result

may have been produced by the appeals process and, given the cost of appeal
relative to the benefits of a reduced assessment, would most likely have
been associated with houses having higher valued financing packages .

This

would explain why the assessment penalty for creative financing falls more
heavily on houses with lower market values .

•

Introduction
The U.S. housing market has been characterized in recent years by the
emergence of unconventional mortgage instruments, including seller contracts,
buydowns and assumption financing.

These instruments are commonly termed

"creative financing," and their popularity stems from the debt service savings
that home buyers obtain due to the relatively lower interest rates that are
charged .

For example, at one point in the early l980's creatively financed

mortgages charged, on average, six percentage points less than conventionally
financed mortgages (Lowry et al, 1983).

The 1982 Census of Governments

(U.S. Department of Commerce, 1984) reports that creative financing was used
in 56 percent of the residential sales sampled in 1981.

This is a conservative

figure in that it is based on assumptions and first mortgages, and does not
account for second and "junior" mortgages.

An important distinction between creative and conventional financing is
that the former is provided by the property owner to the buyer, while the
latter is provided by a third party.

In creatively financed transactions, as

a result, the sale price reflects both the market value of property and the
capitalized value of the financing the seller provides the buyer (Jaffee, 1984).
Numerous studies have established that the debt service savings to buyers
utilizing creative financing is, to varying degrees, capitalized in sale
prices (see Sirmans et al, 1985, for a comprehensive review of the research
on this subject).

A conclusion that normally follows in much of this research

is that the failure to adjust assessments for creative financing will produce
inequities , given that a "fair" tax is one based "on the value of real property
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and not on the characteristics of the buyer and seller or their transaction"
(Kochin and Parks, 1982; p . 516) .

Sirmans et al (1983) conclude :

Since the assessments are based on market val ues , the buyer of a
creativel y financed house faces a higher property tax liability
than the buyer who uses new conventional financing at current
market rates to purchase an identical house. Even though the
'true' market values of the homes are the same, the premium paid
for the financing creates an inequity in the tax system for the
creatively financed buyer.
To eliminate the inequity associated with financing it is typically
recommended that assessed values of creatively financed properties be
adjusted downward by an amount equal to the product of the capitalized debt
service savings and the assessment ratio .

Approximately one third of the

states in the U.S . endorse an assessment policy consistent with this
recommendation (Strathman and Wilcox, 1986), while most of the others have
contemplated adopting a policy to deal with creative financing .
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the changes in assessment equity
attributable t o creative financing .

Our first concern is to determine whether

horizontal inequity increases when a djus t ments for financing are not made by
the assessor .

Horizontal inequity occurs when houses with the same market

values are assessed at different levels .
changes in vertical inequity .

Second, we evaluate corresponding

This type of inequity is produced when assessment

ratios differ systematically with respec t to market values, and can be either
regressive or progressive in nature .

Regressive vertical inequity , for example,

results when lower valued houses are over- assessed and higher valued houses are
under-assessed .

Finally, we test whethe r group assessment discrimina tion

between creatively and conventionally financed houses exists .
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This would

result when a pattern of divergence in assessments arises due solely to
the type of financing employed .

We call this divergence the "assessment

penalty," and its pattern can also be regressive or progressive.

A

regressive assessment penalty results when the percentage deviation in
assessments between creatively and conventionally financed houses is greater
at lower market values than at higher market values.
A sample of 151 residential property sales in Portland, Oregon from the
1981-82 period are the focus of our analysis, which is comprised of two
major parts:
1).

Estimation of the value of debt service savings from creative
financing that is capitalized in housing prices;

2).

Estimation of the changes in assessment equity attributable
to the capitalized value of financing .

Hedonic analysis is employed to estimate the rate of capitalization of the
debt service savings in housing prices.

These savings are measured according

to the method developed by DeLacy( l983).

Paglin and Fogarty's (1972)

approach is then used to determine whether inequities are introduced in
assessments when adjustments for financing are not made.
The general implications of this issue are important for several reasons.
First , property taxes are the source of 75 percent of local tax revenues, and
totalled nearly $100 billion in 1985 (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, 1986) .

Thus inequities resulting from creative financing could

produce substantial shifts in tax burdens.

Second, property values are typically

inferred from a limited amount of information gained from observed sales.
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If

assessments must be adjusted for the effects of financing, this will require
collecting information not presently held by assessors in most states.
Gathering financing information would be costly, and access to it is presently
denied in some states.

If demonstrably better assessments are not produced

with the inclusion of this information, this effort would have questionable
merit.

Given that tests of assessment equity have not been applied to this

point, the question of whether significant inequities result when adjustments
for financing are not made has not been resolved (Strathman and Wilcox, 1986) .
Effects of Creative Financing on Assessment Equity
In estimating the market values of all properties in a jurisdiction the
assessor must make use of information provided by a limited number of recent
sales.

The task facing the assessor is one of developing a valuation method

to estimate what price each " unsold" property would have brought had it been
sold during the period, based on a sample of prices and attributes of the
properties that actually were transacted .

A valuation method formulated

along these lines tacitly assumes that observed sale prices represent the
market value of property .

When the savings to buyers using creative financing

are capitalized in sale prices the assessor ' s benchmark for market value
becomes unreliable.

If the taxes imposed in the jurisdiction are set

according to the objective that they reflect the value of property and not
values attributable to the transaction of property, it becomes important to
establish reference prices that are purged of the influence of financing .
Alternatively , if the effects of financing are not taken into account in the
assessment process, the pertinent question would be "To what extent does this
confound the assessor ' s estimates of value?"
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If a bias due to financing

exists assessments could be judged to be equitable when they are actually
not , and tax shifts would be manifested within the residential property class,
in residential properties relative to other classes, and in some jurisdictions
relative to others .
Figure 1 illustrates how differences in the definition of market value
attributable to the capitalization of creative financing can influence the
evaluation of assessment equity .

Two perfect equity lines (e-e and e- e*) are

presented, representing alternative ideal situations wherein all properties
are assessed at an identical percentage of market value.

The difference in

the slopes of these perfect equity lines (which is exagerated in the figure
to ease inspection) results from differences in the definition of market value.
The slope of line e-e is defined as the ratio of the mean assessed value (AV)
to the mean observed sale price (MV) .

Line i-i is drawn relative to this

perfect equity line to represent the actual ratio estimated by a regression of
AV on MV.

Vertical inequity is present when the slopes of the e-e and i-i

lines differ .

An index measure of vertical inequity based on this difference

would be 1 - bi/be, where the b values represent the respective slopes.

An

index value greater than zero indicates regressive vertical inequity (illustrated
in Figure 1), while a value less than zero indicates progressive vertical
inequity .

Horizontal inequity is measured by the ratio of the standard error

of estimate from the i-i regression to the mean assessed value: SEE/AV.
The other perfect equity line (e-e*) in Figure 1 represents the ideal
situation where the capitalized value of creative financing has been subtracted
from the observed sale price.

The slope of this line is determined as follows:
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Figure 1
Perfect Equity Lines for Observed (e- e) and Adjusted (e-e*) Prices
and Associated Hypothetical AV-MV Regressions (i-i; i*-i*)
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AV

be*

MV

F)

(1)

• where

the mean assessed value;

AV
MV

(r

=

the mean observed price;

r

the proportion of properties that used creative financing;

F

the mean capitalized value of creative financing in the
sales where it was used.

The change in the slope of the perfect equity line is positively related
to both the proportion of residences utilizing creative financing and the
value of financing capitalized in housing prices.

Holding the tax rate

fixed, the difference in the slopes of the two equity lines (be* - be)
measures the proportionate increase in the average tax burden on the
residential property class attributable to the presence of creative financing.
The slope of the i*-i* regression line in Figure 1 is shown to shift in
the same proportion as the e- e * line, leaving the measure of vertical
inequity unchanged.

This would occur if the capitalized value of creative

financing is a constant share of the market value .

Alternatively, when the

capitalized benefits of financing are proportionately greater for lower
valued homes, a relative increase in regressive vertical inequity would
result .

The effects of purging the value of financing on horizontal

inequity depend on how prevalent creat ive financing is in the housing market
and also on whether the capitalized values are a fixed share of the market
value.

If all properties were creatively financed and the capitalized value

of financing represented the same proportion of the value of each sale,
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horizontal inequities would not change given the change in definition of
market value.

A number of states have adopted a "prevailing market"

assessment policy (Strathman and Wilcox, 1986) which in effect presumes
that the two conditions noted above hold.

Thus, changes in horizontal

equity, where they exist , can be traced to a failure of either of these
two conditions to hold in reality .

One would expect the greatest increases

in horizontal inequity to occur when half the properties are creatively
financed and the correlation between the capitalized value of financing
and the market value equals zero .
Figure 2 illustrates the outcome when some of the properties are
creatively financed and some are conventionally financed .

The perfect

equity line e- e* is reproduced from Figure 1, and two new equity lines
are introduced: e-e~, associated with creatively financed houses, and
e-e2, associated with conventionally financed houses.

Using this figure

we can directly examine systematic assessment discrimination between
creatively and conventionally financed houses.

In the aggregate this can

be measured in terms of the difference in the slopes of the respective
perfect equity lines.

The actual contrast in assessments is represented

by the area between the respective i-i regression lines.

We call this

area the systematic "assessment penalty" attributable to financing conditions .
When the capitalized value of creative financing is a constant share of the
market value of housing this penalty will be neutrally distributed with
respect to changes in market value .

If the capitalized value of financing

represents a larger share of market value for lower valued houses than for
higher valued houses, the assessment penalty wil l be regressively distributed .
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Figure 2
Perfect Equity Lines for Overall Sample (e- e*) , Creatively
Financed (e-et) and Conven tionally Financed (e-e ) Houses
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*

The relationships illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 are operationalized
empirically in the following manner.

First, we are interested in estimating

the systematic structure of assessments based on the level of information
at the assessor ' s disposal .

This dictates that we accept observed sale

prices as the representatives of market value, and apply the Paglin- Fogarty
regression model as it was originally specified :
(2)

where Si represents the observed sale price.

The estimated regression

coefficient s are evaluated with respect to the null hypotheses pertaining
to vertical equity, i.e.,

(3)

The coefficient of horizontal inequity is also determined given the standard
error of estimate and the mean assessed value.

Next, we introduce new

information pertaining to the capitalized value of financing.

We purge the

observed sale prices of this value, thereby generating a new surrogate
for market value based solely on the value of property.

This leads to

the following specification:
(4)

Fi

the value of debt service savings associated with the
use of creative financing in the i th property;

v

= the estimated capitalization rate.
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The parameter estimates from equation 4 are also evaluated in terms of
vertical and horizontal equity .

We then calculate the changes in the

vertical and horizontal inequity coefficients between equations 2 and 4
to determine the changes in the levels of inequity attributable to the
effects of creative financing on the measures of market value.
Finally, we decompose the total sample into conventional and creatively
financed subsamples and re-estimate equation 4 for both subsamples in order
to test whether the estimated patterns of assessments can be systematically
distinguished on the basis of financing conditions .

The Chow test (Chow, 1960)

is applied to the sets of coefficients in the subsamples in reference to
the coefficients estimated for the total sample.

The results of the Chow

test will indicate whether systematic assessment discrimination exists
as related to financing.

Using the coefficients from the subsamples, we

then calculate the assessment penalty over the range of market values in
the sample.
The approach outlined above hinges on recovering an estimate of the rate
of capitalization of creative financing benefits in housing prices .

Knowing

the capitalization rate, we can then purge observed sale prices of the value
of financing and thus isolate the systematic effects of financing conditions
on assessment equity.

The estimation of this capitalization rate is taken

up in the next section .
Capitalization of Creative Financing
A sample of 151 single family residential sales was selected from an
area of southeast Portland to operationalize our analysis.
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An effort was

made to define the study area to be as homogeneous as possible with respect
to socioeconomic and physical factors to control for neighborhood effects
on housing prices (Linneman, 1980) .

The study area can thus be described

as a submarket within the overall metropolitan housing market.

The sample

represents nearly 5 percent of all sales reported in the study area by the
Oregon Multiple Listing Service, and includes transactions that occurred
between June 1981 and July 1982 .

Sale prices, assessed values and the

physical characteristics of the properties were obtained from the Multnomah
County Office of Assessment and Taxation .

Each of the sample properties

had been subject to an on- site appraisal during the preceeding year .

Data

on financing were taken from earnest money agreements provided by area
real estate brokers.
Creative financing was utilized in 123 of the sample observations.
These transactions were selected to recover an estimate of the capitalization
rate.

Seller contracts were the predominant source of mortgage credit in

this subsample, accounting for 71 percent of the transactions.

Assumptions

represented 10 percent of the total, while the remaining 19 percent were
financed by a combined assumption-seller contract arrangement.
The following model was specified to estimate the capitalization rate
associated with creative financing benefits:

s

f(

! ,

MKT , TIME , DIST , F ) , where

S

the observed sale price;

X

a vector of housing attributes, including
HSIZE

= finished living area, in square feet;
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(5)

MSTORY

=

a multiple story dummy variable (1 if multistory,
0 if single story) ;

BSMT

a basement dummy variable (1 if the residence has
a basement, 0 if not) ;

LSIZE

FPL
BATHS

AGE

the size of the lot, in square feet;
a fireplace dummy variable (1 if present, 0 if not);
the number of bathrooms;
the age of the residence, in years;

GAR= a garage dummy variable (1 if present, 0 if not);

MKT

the number of days the residence was listed for sale ;

=

= 13;

TIME

the month of sale, with June 1981

DIST

the distance from the residence to the downt own core,

1 to June 1982

in hundreds of feet;
F

the present value of the debt service savings derived from
the use of creative financing, in dollars.

With the exception of financing the variables listed above are
representative of the attributes employed in hedonic analysis of housing
prices (Weicher and Hartzell, 1982), and are consistent with the level of
information maintained in the records of most assessors .

The financing

variable was measured using DeLacy ' s (1983) truncated cash flow method,
which determines the present value of the stream of monthly debt service
savings that results from using creative financing rather than a conventional
mortgage instrument.

It is represented as follows:

-13-

60

Pc - Pcf , where
(1 + r)i

F
i

Pc

.=

(6)

1

the monthly deb t service for a conventional
mortgage instrument;

Pcf

the monthly debt service for the observed
creat ively finan ced mortgage ;

r

= the discount rate .

DeLacy ' s truncated cash f l ow method limits t he discounting period to
a maximum of five years, reflecting the average holding period for residential
property .

This limit is imposed because creatively financed mortgages are

typically subject to due-on- sale provisions .

Thus the buyer benefits from

lower debt service for the period of ownership rather than the stated term
of the loan .

Second, the higher default risks associated with creative

financing (Koch et al , 1982) are reflected in a discount rate that exceeds
the new conventional mortgage rate .
The means, standard deviations, parameter estimates and t-values for
the capitalization model are presented in Table 1.

The majority of the

coeffi ci ents are s t atistical ly signif i cant and the i r signs are consistent
with expectations .

Given our focus on the capitalization rate for financing

benefits , we will limit the discussion of these results to t hat coefficient
and effectively treat the r emaining variables as controls fo r exogenous
sources of bias .
The coefficient associated with the financing variable, which is directly
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Tab l e 1
Capitalization Model Descriptive St a tistics and Parameter Estimates

Hean
HSIZE

1264

Standard
Deviation

Estimated
Coefficient
16.32

380

t-value
5 . 6o*

MS TORY

. 42

.50

- 1258 . 89

-.68

BSMT

. 74

. 44

2338 . 86

1. 53

. 04

. 13

LSIZE

6315
. 62

.49

7178 . 91

4 . 69*

1. 27

.42

3527.01

1 . 94*

21. 68

- 131. 36

-2 . 92*

. 43

-1952.59

-1.16

-2.04

- . 17

FPL
BATHS
AGE

46

GAR
MKT
TIME

DIST
F

2460

.76
70

55
3 . 48

7. 17

-528 . 38

294

120

4 . 70

.60

5790

2111

1.04

3 . 11 *

31 , 435 . 63

6 . 34 *

INTERCEPT
R2

. 66
16.43

F

SEE

7067
123

N

*

-2 . 74 *

Statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence .
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interpretable as the capitalization rate, indicates that 104 percent of the
present value of the debt service savings from creative financing is capitalized
in housing prices.

Evaluated at the sample means, creatively financed

transactions incurred a premium totalling $6,020.

This premium represents

over 10 percent of the mean observed price ($56,700).
Empirical Results
Given the estimate of the capitalization rate associated with creative
financing benefits, we then estimated the effects of financing on assessment
equity according to the format set forth earlier.

Table 2 contains the

pertinent regression results, the calculated slopes of the associated perfect
equity lines, and the vertical and horizontal inequity coefficients.
The slopes of the perfect equity lines show the assessment ratios (AV/MV)
for the overall sample based on observed sale prices and on sale prices
adjusted for capitalization of the financing benefits, as well as for subsamples based on the type of financing used .

When observed sale prices are

used as the benchmark for market value the slope of the perfect equity line
( . 999) shows that the assessor is nominally adhering to a full market value
standard.

When the capitalized value of financing is subtracted from the

observed prices of the creatively financed houses in the sample, the slope of
the perfect equity line increases to 1.093 .

The difference between these two

slopes can be interpreted as the change in the average effective tax rate for
the overall sample attributable to the capitalization of financing benefits.
For the conventionally financed subsample the perfect equity slope is
1 . 016, while for the creatively financed subsample it is 1 . 113 .
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These slopes

Table 2
AV-MV Regression Results* and Assessment Inequity Coefficients

1. Total Sample,
Observed Prices
2 . Total Sample,
Adjusted Prices

Perfect
Equity
Slope

Vertical
Inequity
Coefficient

Horizontal
Inequity
Coefficient

Intercept

bi

- 876
(-.34)

1. 014
(22 . 93)

. 78

6467

. 999

-.015

.114

3255
( 1. 29)

1.030
(21.58)

. 76

6776

1.093

.058

.120

-3932

1.086
(11.28)

. 83

6906

1.016

- . 069

. 121

(- . 71)

2981
(1.07)

1 . 054
(19.59)

. 76

6433

1.113

. 053

. 114

R2

SEE

I
f-"'

-...J

I

3. Conventionally
Financed
Subsample
4 . Creatively
Financed
Subsample

*

t-values are given in parentheses.

are 1.7 and 11.4 percent greater than the benchmark slope, and indicate how
the increase in the effective tax rate is distributed between the two groups.
Clearly , the creatively financed houses absorb virtually all of the increase
in the effective tax rate.

Comparing the perfect equity slopes for the two

subsamples gives us the average assessment differential due to financing,
a broad indicator of horizontal inequity along the lines discussed by
Sirmans et al (1983) .

On average, the effective tax rate for creatively

financed houses is 9 . 5 percent higher than for conventionally financed
houses.
The average differences in assessment ratios tell us nothing about the
actual distribution of assessments over the range of market values, however.
This information is provided by the regression results in Table 2.

Estimates

for the overall sample using observed sale prices (corresponding with
equation 2) are given in the first row .

The coefficients indicate the

presence of a small degree (not statistically significant) of progressive
vertical inequity, and horizontal inequities averaging over 11 percent of
the mean assessed value .

The coefficients given in the second row

(corresponding with equation 4), where the capitalized value of financing
benefits have been subtracted from the observed sale prices, show slight
(again, not statistically s i gnificant) regressive vertical inequity .

The

coefficient of horizontal inequity also increases to more than 12 percent
of the mean assessed value .

The difference in the two horizontal inequity

coefficients (approximately 5 percent) represents the change in horizontal
inequity in the overall sample attributable to financing conditions .
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The final two regressions examine the two subgroups for systematic
assessment discrimination as related to financing conditions.

The Chow

test was applied to the sums of squares from the two regressions
(in reference to the overall sample regression with prices adjusted for
financing), producing an F statistic of 6.98 with 2 and 147 degrees of
freedom .

The calculated value surpasses the critical Fat the .002 level,

indicating significant differences in the coefficient sets for the
conventional and creatively financed subgroups.

Thus the test supports

the existence of assessment discrimination on the basis of financing
conditions .
Given the opposing vertical orientations for the two subgroups slightly regressive for creatively financed houses and slightly progressive
for conventionally financed houses - the resulting pattern of assessment
discrimination between the subgroups is regressive .

Using the regression

coefficients from the two subgroups we can calculate the estimated assessed
values for the range of market values in the study and determine the
systematic pattern of the " assessment penalty" for creatively financed
houses .

These values are given in Table 3.

Regressivity of the assessment

penalty is established (in the final column) by the fact that it represents
a smaller percentage of market value for higher valued than lower valued
houses .

Moreover, the same pattern results when considering the absolute

value of the assessment penalty.
The assessment penalty ' s regressive pattern could have been produced
by a departure from policies dictating that no adjustments for financing
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Table 3
Assessment Penalty for Creative Financing
and its Relation to Market Value

Market
Value

Estimated
Assessed Val.
(Creative)

Estimated
Assessed Val.
(Conventional)

Absolute
Assessment
Penalty

Assessment
Penalty
as a % of
Market Value

$40,000

$45, 141

$39,508

$5,633

14.1

50,000

55,681

50,368

5,313

10.6

60,000

66,221

61,228

4,993

8.3

70,000

76, 761

72 , 088

4,673

6. 7

80,000

87,301

82 , 948

4,353

5. 4

90,000

97,841

93,808

4, 033

4.5

100,000

108, 381

104,668

3, 713

3.7
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be made in assessments .

To examine this possibility we regressed assessed

values on the observed sale prices and the value of debt service savings
for the 123 creatively financed houses.

The results of this regression

are as follows :
AVi

273.0 + 1.035 Si - .456 Fi
( . 09) (19 . 51)
( 1. 5 8)

R2 = . 78

SEE = 6202

The coefficient associated with the financing variable is significant at
the .06 level, and indicates that nearly half the value of creative financing
is negatively capi talized in assessments.

Thus it appears that the assessor

has "split the difference" between the alternatives of ignoring and fully
accounting for the capitalization of financing benefits in housing prices.
This result also suggests why the pattern of vertical inequity for creatively
financed houses is regressive , in contrast with the progressive pattern for
conventionally financed houses .

Some possible reasons for this result are

discussed in the concluding section .
Conclusions
Our analysis of the changes in assessment equity resulting from the
use of creative financing can be grouped into four major findings .

First ,

we found that horizontal inequity increased approximately 5 percent when
observed sale prices were corrected for the capitalization of creative
financing .

This small increase was primaril y due to the composition of

the sample, as over 80 percent of the houses were creatively financed .
Given the predominance of creatively financed houses in the sample, a
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correction for financing effects should not be expected to produce a very
large change in the horizontal inequity coefficient.

In effect, our

analysis shows that horizontal differences do not emerge when a very large
proportion of the sample undergoes a transformation .

This is , in fact, the

rationale that a number of states have used in decidi ng not to adopt a
policy to adjust for creative financing (Strathman and Wilcox, 1986); when
conditions in the mortgage market are characterized by extensive use of
creative financing, horizontal inequity among creatively financed houses
is not a serious concern .
Although horizontal inequity did not increase noticeably following the
correction for financing benefits , this correction did lead to an increase
in the real tax rate for these properties; this is our second major finding.
To the extent that the change in the use of creative financing was limited
to the residential housing market, it generated a tax shift that increased
the tax burden on residential properties relative to commercial and industrial
properties .
Third, we found that the assessment penalty for creatively financed
houses was regressively distributed with respect to their market values.
The estimated penalty was $5,600 for a $40,000 house (14 percent of market
value), while for a $100, 000 house the penalty was $3, 700 (only 4 percent
of market value).

Thus the increase in the property tax burden due to the

effects of financing was more heavily concentrated at the low end of the
market.
Fourth, we found a pattern of negative capitalization of creative
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financing benefits statistically evident in assessments .

Assessment policy

in Oregon at that time did not endorse adjustments for financing.

This

finding, however, was more likely to have been produced by the appeals process
than by the action of the assessor .

Owners of creatively financed houses

could appeal their assessments and obtain an adjustment, basing the appeal
on a professional appraisal that estimated market value using comparable
properties that were conventionally financed .

The Board of Equalization may

have approved a reduction on the basis of such an appraisal , tacitly
contradicting the "no adjustment" policy .

Evidence for this can be found

in the rate of appeals filed during the period when creative financing gained
popularity .

Historically, about one percent of the residential assessments

in Multnomah County ( the tax jurisdiction for the study area) have been
appealed in any given year .

During the 1980-83 creative financing boom about

3 percent of all residential assessments were appealed annually.

On the basis

of the composition of our sample, the rate of successful appeals would have
had to increase to over 6 percent to account for the negative capitalization
of the debt service savings of the typical creatively financed house.

However,

given the cost of obtaining an appraisal, there is reason to expect that
appeals are likely to be filed by homeowners who stand to gain the greatest
reduction in their assessments.

The decision to file an appeal would be

rational if the appeal costs are less than the present value of the tax
savings from a reduced assessment multiplied by the probability that the
Board of Equalization acts favorably on the appeal.

Given an appraisal cost

of $300, a probability of successful appeal of .5, a property tax rate of
.028, and discounting the tax savings at 10 percent over five years, the
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break-even reduction in assessed value would be just over $5,600 .

Thus if

the capitalized value of financing were greater than this amount it would
have been in the owner ' s interest to choose to appeal .
The impact of creative financing on assessment equity clearly has
greater distributional effects than previously thought.

While some areas

of previous concern (e . g., those dealing with conventional indicators of
horizontal inequity) have not been supported by our analysis, other equity
concerns (e . g ., the pattern of the assessment penalty and the shift in the
tax burden to creatively financed houses) have newly emerged here.

These

distributional issues can be resolved in pratice, but it will require
additional financing information in the states where adjustments are not
presently made .
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